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THE END OF THE FRENCH RELIGIOUS PROTECTORATE 
IN JERUSALEM (1918-1924)
1
 
 
 
In early 1924, last vestiges of the protectorate exercised by France for four 
centuries – and unbroken except for World War I – over the “Latin” Christians 
of the former Ottoman Empire disappeared. The era of the privileged French 
presence in Palestine and more specifically in Jerusalem – the seat of the most 
venerated Christian Holy Places – had come to a close. For French diplomacy, 
this failure signaled its ultimate defeat in the battle against the English begun as 
of late 1915 for the possession of Palestine, and lost for all extents and purposes 
as of 1918. The liquidation of the protectorate is hence one facet, and one of the 
least well-known ones, of the Middle East settlement at the end of the First 
World War, which resulted among other outcomes in the awarding of Palestine 
to the British. 
To date historical research has neglected this feature of the Palestinian 
settlement and has focused on the main outcomes, the British victory and the 
French defeat; namely, aside from the local power play between the two 
powers, their variable success in handling the nationalistic Zionistic and Arab 
factors. Nevertheless, this diplomatic battle which ended in April 1920 at San 
Remo, left two totally or partially unresolved issues: the fate of the religious 
protectorate and the setting of the Syrian-Palestinian border. These were 
doubtless secondary issues, but their solutions have direct bearing on current 
issues – the regime of the Holy Places and control of water in the region. 
Although France succeeded in obtaining most of its border demands 
including the refusal to cede the Litani river and Mount Hermon to British and 
Zionist Palestine, it experienced a predictable setback as regards the 
protectorate. Why did France so relentlessly pursue a form of influence which 
had already been devalued before the War and already a lost cause? Why were 
the British, already the masters of Palestine and determined to remain the 
undivided ruler patient for so long? Lastly, why did the termination of the 
                                                                
1 This article is the revised and amended version of a paper presented in July 1992 at the 
workshop Jerusalem in the Mind of the Western World held in Jerusalem by the International 
Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization. 
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French protectorate fail to lead to a durable solution to the problem of the Holy 
Places? Examination of the archives of the Quai d’Orsay, in addition to S.I. 
Minerbi's work on the attitude of Italy and the Vatican in this field
2
, can provide 
some clues. The definitive response would obviously also require in-depth 
exploration of the British archives. 
First and foremost however, we need a better picture of what this centuries-
old institution of the protectorate stood for in 1917, when General Allenby's 
army, dutifully escorted by the diplomat Francois Georges-Picot, the French 
High Commissioner, made his formal entry into Jerusalem liberated from the 
Turks. 
 
The protectorate and the Powers at the end of 1917 
When the Holy City was returned to Christian hands for the first time since 
the Crusades, the protectorate had ceased to exist for three years. On September 
9, 1914, the Ottoman government, taking advantage of the outbreak of war in 
Europe, announced its decision to abolish Capitulations from the following 
October 1. Some of these imbalanced treaties, extracted in the 16
th
 and then in 
the 18
th
 centuries by France from the weakened Empire – both commercial and 
institutional treaties granting French citizens individual and religious freedom – 
were the legal basis of the protectorate system
3
. 
Since 1535, the date of the well-known agreement between Suleiman and 
Francois 1
st
, the “Elder Daughter of the Church” was granted the right to protect 
its subjects residing in the Empire. This protection was expanded in 1740 both 
individually and collectively to cover all the members of the clergy adhering to 
the Latin rite settled in the Levant, regardless of nationality or institution. These 
legal privileges were extended by custom to Orthodox Christians. 
Three “paradoxes” can account for the birth and the longevity of the 
complex protectorate system, as well as its devolution to France. Moslem 
domination, which was Arab from the year 638 and then Ottoman from the 
years 1516-1517 over the Christian Holy Places, the sanctuaries and their 
dependencies created numerous problems which made the intercession and the 
protection of a Christian power desirable. Since the head of the Vatican State 
and Christianity, the most directly affected was forbidden to have contacts with 
the Infidel, a secular branch capable (depending on the era) of flattering or 
                                                                
2 Sergio I. Minerbi, L'ltalie et la Palestine, 1914-1920, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 
1970, and The Vatican and Zionism, Conflict in the Holy Land, 1895-1925, Oxford University 
Press, 1990. 
 
3 Bernardin Collin, Le Problème juridique des Lieux saints, Librairie Sirey, 1956, and Les Lieux 
saints, Paris, PUF, Que Sais-je, n° 998, 1969. A. O'Mahony, G. Gunner and K. Hintlian (eds) The 
Christian Heritage in the Holy Land, London Scorpion Cavendish, 1995. 
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standing up to the Turks was hence indispensable. Similarly, an arbitrator 
capable of policing the sanctuaries was needed, in particular after the eleventh 
century when the rites and churches resulting from successive schisms jostled 
viciously to officiate. This peace-keeping mission was held for many years by 
Byzantium, and then Venice. Beginning in the sixteenth century France, the 
“Elder Daughter of the Church” but also the ally of the Turks because of its 
hereditary rivalry with Austria, took over this role with the blessings of the 
Vatican. 
The sheer length of time France had exercised the protectorate helped 
consolidate its position as the protector of the Latins. Acquired experience 
made France the informed interpreter of an infinitely complex tradition and 
hence the best guarantor of an always precarious peace. In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, bloody squabbles often occurred between Latins and 
Greek Orthodox over the assignment of sanctuaries to clergymen and rites 
performed. The intervention of the Christian powers, in particular France in 
1690, helped reduce Latin losses while establishing relative calm through the 
“Status Quo”, the de facto situation which existed in the Holy Places which had 
to be maintained. This Status Quo of the Holy Places based on the short 
Ottoman royal decree (firman) of 1852, but primarily on the extensive 
unrecorded common law was nevertheless recognized by the Powers signing 
the Berlin Treaty in 1878.
4
 
France’s special position involved a whole series of duties, some of which 
were unattractive as it was quick to point out, but it also enjoyed rights and 
honorific privileges which were the tangible proof of its dominance. In terms of 
duties, France's representatives, the Ambassador in Constantinople and after 
1843, the Consul in Jerusalem was obligated to assist the Latins in their 
disputes with or appeals to the Ottoman Authorities. Other sensitive duties 
included arbitrating the conflicts between the clergy from different rites on the 
basis of the status quo and a vast set of precedents which at times required 
appealing to the public authorities. But the price paid for these efforts was 
rewarded since the representatives of France ruled over the Catholic clientele 
and during religious ceremonies held in the Holy Land, in particular in the Saint 
Sepulchre, were given carefully codified liturgical honors which made them the 
most eminent foreign dignitaries in Jerusalem.
5
 
Nevertheless the protectorate abolished by the Turks in 1914 had already 
                                                                
4 The status quo is mentioned in article 62 of the Treaty of Berlin. Before 1914, there was only a 
non-official status quo document, the Règlement du très Saint Sépulchre, written by P. Frédéric 
de Ghyvelde between 1887 and 1895. 
5 The consul, in full uniform, sat in a special seat and place during the services. Greeted by a 
particularly deferent expression he had the privilege (among other things) of presenting holy 
water at the entrance of the Saint Sepulchre and incense in the sanctuary. 
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lost some of its former splendor. Even though the position of France had been 
recognized by the European Powers in 1878, its protectorate over individuals 
and non-French establishments weakened progressively through efforts of 
competitive nations, who were concerned about protecting their citizens and 
obtained the necessary Capitulations from the Sublime Porte. Russia, which as 
of the end of the 18
th
 century and even more so after 1820 created the first 
breach, by positioning itself as the protector of the Orthodox. Others such as 
Germany followed suit, and ultimately Italy who had signed an agreement with 
France in 1905 allowing Italian institutions that so desired to withdraw from 
French protection. Data qre scarce on the real decline of the French protection 
of Catholics in Palestine but it was felt, especially after the break in diplomatic 
relations between France and the Vatican and the separation of Church and 
State in 1904-1905. In addition the consuls expressed their regret that aside 
from French institutions the protectorate had been reduced to Franciscan 
institutions of the Custody of the Holy Land and the Latin Patriarchate. 
However the Custody, theoretically an international institution, but primarily 
Italian in reality, was no longer as secure a support as in the past. 
Another sign of the decadence of the system was the growing impatience of 
the Foreign Powers as regards the special honors rendered to the representatives 
of France in the sanctuaries. For example the National Association for Italian 
Missionaries, a lobby which made pressing demands on the government of 
Rome to intervene more actively in the Holy Land, called for the abolition of 
“religious hegemonies” over the Holy Places and the formation of a “universal 
and Catholic” tutelage.
6 
This led to incessant intrigues between the Custody, 
supported generally by Italy and the Patriarchate, an antique institution revived 
by the Pope in 1847 and favored by the French. 
How did the French diplomacy respond to these inroads and petty quarrels? 
The tradition of the protectorate continued to be used as one of the arguments 
supporting France's imperialistic designs on the Middle East, above all in Syria. 
Paris, however, was resigned to the decline of the institution, in particular 
since the break in diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Some diplomats of the 
old school, such as Paul Cambon and Camille Barrère, naturally expressed their 
sorrow, but others such as the Ambassador in Constantinople, Maurice 
Bompard, in no way shared their nostalgia and were persuaded that economic 
and financial tactics should be the instrument of modern imperialism. The 
Christian population in Palestine tended in fact to decline. Naturally France did 
not relinquish the still considerable remains of tile protectorate, which was 
valued in particular on the eve of the War for its educational outreach and the 
support it provided for the spread of the French language in the Middle East. 
                                                                
6 Sergio I. Minerbi, L'ltalie et la Palestine, op. cit, pp. 152-153. 
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This position, imposed by tradition and the Catholic beliefs of the diplomatic 
corps, tended to discourage France from seeking favors from other religious 
clientele, such as the Jews
7
 whose numbers were on the increase. In contrast, 
the advancement of French influence in Syria and Palestine was cloaked in 
tangible investments of ports and railroads, as was the case for the Franco-
Turkish agreement in early 1914. 
The system was thus already in decline, its foundations shaken by the 
broken alliance between France and the Vatican when it ceased to function in 
October-November of 1914. Abolished legally by the unilateral decision of the 
Sublime Porte, the protectorate ceased to function on paper while its real 
reasons for being vanished in part after the expulsion by the Turkish Authorities 
of the Consuls and clergy belonging to the Allied nations. There was however 
no official declaration on the part of France or the Allies on this subject, 
doubtless because they initially hoped to prevent Turkey from joining the 
Central Powers, and later hoped to have Turkey (who entered the war on 
November 2) agree to a separate compromise peace treaty. 
Until the spring of 1915, the Quai d’Orsay, like most of the “Colonial 
Parties” interested in Syria – the “Syrians” as they were called – hoped that the 
Ottoman Empire would once again emerge unscathed by withdrawing from the 
War in time. They were aware that the “disappearance of Turkey along with the 
privileged position that a long tradition of formal treaties guarantee to our 
citizens and our country would seriously affect the situation of France in this 
part of the world.”
8
 In fact, French diplomacy quickly realized that the partition 
which it hoped to achieve with a “Greater Syria” incorporating Palestine would 
be accompanied by concessions to its allies as regards the protectorate. 
Sazonoff, the Foreign Minister under Nicholas II, only agreed to recognize 
France’s “freedom of movement” in Syria-Palestine and in Cilicia, in April 
1915, “provided a future regime is established for the Holy Places.” Aristide 
Briand who was then the Président du Conseil and the Foreign Minister ordered 
Georges-Picot, who was about to negotiate for the partition of the Middle East 
with the English, to defend the rights and religious privileges of France and 
even to have France “simply (...) replace Turkey as the police force.” However 
in the case of a “preemptory” British refusal to leave the Holy Places to the 
French, he orders his emissary to accept “the depolitization of Jerusalem and 
Bethlehem (...) by specifying that it would remain limited to the areas strictly 
                                                                
7 Catherine Nicault, La France et le sionisme, 1896-1914, thesis, Université de Paris I, 1985, 
2 vol., and La France et le sionisme, 1897-1948 : Une rencontre manquée , Paris, Calmann-Levy, 
“Diaspora” series, 1992. 
8 M.A.E., A Paix, 177, letter from A. Briand to F. Georges-Picot, representative of the French 
embassy in London, November 2, 1915. 
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necessary around the two cities.”
9
 
Collusion between Britain and Russia made the move to internationalization 
inevitable, and was associated with a geographic extension which the French 
had not predicted. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 lay the 
groundwork for a yet unspecified form of “international administration” over 
most of Palestine described as a “brown zone”. As soon as Italy, which had 
entered the war the previous year, obtained a copy of this agreement in October 
1916, it wasted no time proclaiming that it was “directly concerned by the 
governing of the Holy Places” and stating its desire to terminate the French 
protectorate through internationalization, the solution which Sydney Sonnino, 
the unflinching Italian Foreign Minister would support until the end. 
This French retreat was purely tactical, since the prime objective was to 
obtain a partition agreement from Britain, its most dangerous rival in the 
Middle East. Picot and his friends the “Syrians” who were highly influential at 
the Quai d'Orsay, intended to revise the Palestinian arrangement with the help 
in particular of Russian backing. In this context, demands concerning the 
protectorate itself were of no interest. They regained their relevance however 
when the chances of obtaining a French Palestine were dashed at the start of 
1917, both by flie first Russian revolution and the growing threat of sole British 
conquest of the Holy Land, since France was unable to divert even a small 
contingent of its forces from the Western Front. This accounts for the efforts 
made by Picot and Denys Cochin, a renowned Catholic politician and at that 
time the Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Vatican, in April 
and June 1917, to plead his cause in vain for the prolongation of the religious 
protectorate in British-controlled Palestine
10
. Forced to abandon all hope for an 
exclusively French Palestine, the Quai resigned itself first of all to the 
establishment of a Franco-British condominium and then towards the end of 
1917, to an internationalization which would still enable France to remain at 
least somewhat on the scene. In this new context, the protectorate argument, 
which up to then had been somewhat on the sidelines, once again became center 
stage. The liberation of Jerusalem thus found France determined to assert its 
claims. Success was doubtful nevertheless, when victorious England replaced 
senescent Turkey in the Holy Land and the Vatican, who gave its moral seal of 
approval to the system, took the opportunity to free itself from France. 
 
The first battle is lost: the end of the principle of the traditional French 
protectorate (1918-1920). 
Although tightly linked to the Franco-British negotiations on the political 
                                                                
9 Ibid, id. From M. Paléologue, ambassador of France in Petrograd to T. Delcassé, April 15, 1915. 
10 Sergio I. Minerbi. L'Italie et la Palestine, op.cit., pp. 155-156 
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future of Palestine, the negotiations concerning the protectorate operated from 
their inception on a fairly autonomous basis. First, unlike the political 
discussions which were voluntarily frozen in May 1916 at the start of the Peace 
Conference in January 1919, the battle over the protectorate started at the end of 
1917 as soon as Palestine was occupied. Secondly, they involved players aside 
from Zionists and Arabs, namely the Vatican and Italy. Paradoxically, this 
interference, more than the British factor, fueled France's ambition to restore its 
protectorate whatever the price. 
British bad faith was obvious in this area as it was for Palestine as a whole, 
which it viewed as its private hunting ground since Lloyd George became 
Prime Minister in December 1916. But in the transitional phase of British 
occupation, it did not dare take radical initiatives as regards religion. Relying 
solely on its customary pragmatism, it clearly placed the problem of the Holy 
Places low on its list of priorities. The temporary maintenance of the 
protectorate may have been seen as a means of satisfying its French ally's 
disproportional aims, in a context of growing tension, while avoiding a delicate 
duty even though Turkish defeat was still not complete. Allenby thus solemnly 
promises to respect the customs of Palestine and let Georges-Picot enter in full 
dress uniform into Jerusalem as did the Consuls of France in by-gone years to 
take office or welcome civil or religious dignitaries. Although it is doubtless 
excessive on the part of the representative of France to claim as he did in 
December 1917 that there was an agreement among the Powers that France 
could continue to exercise its religious protection, there was something of a 
tacit agreement that the right to domination was not enough to seal the fate of 
the Middle East in general. Lastly, as the mighty Protestant Power supporting 
the Zionist enterprise, Britain was interested in not obfuscating the Vatican. 
London however also knew it could count on the Vatican's wish to see the 
Christian Holy Places finally attributed a permanent international status to 
undermine the weak reestablished French protectorate as well as Italian 
ambitions. 
Indeed F. Georges Picot had enormous trouble making the protectorate 
work, since deprived of true means of imposing his authority, he attached great 
value to this institution as an instrument of prestige. The nearness of the 
Christmas holidays to the liberation of Jerusalem, and soon afterwards the 
Easter ceremonies in February-March of 1918 provided Italy with numerous 
opportunities via the Custody to challenge the protectorate. The first incident 
was not long in the waiting. On Christmas eve 1917, torn between Picot’s desire 
to obtain the liturgical honors during the high mass in Bethlehem and the 
protestations of the commander of the Italian detachment of Allenby’s army, 
the Custody was sent a decision from cardinal Gasparri, the Secretary of State 
of the Holy See stating that “once the Turkish domination has ceased, the 
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French protectorate will also have ceased”. This Vatican stance, which Paris 
had been notified of in the Spring of 1917 was confirmed on January 12, 1918 
by Gasparri to the English representative to the Holy See. It stated that the end 
of the Capitulations removed all legal foundation for a French protectorate that 
in any case had become superfluous.
11
 In the eyes of the Vatican the 
protectorate was over. But in fact it left it up to the British to decide upon the 
transitory regime to establishing while waiting for peace. 
In these conditions, the British Military Authorities decided not to intervene, 
and resigned themselves to maintaining temporarily the status quo and the pre-
war ceremonials. Since the Custody had split into two factions, Picot continued 
to enjoy the honors in the absence it must be said of representatives of other 
Christian Powers who now abstained from these ceremonies. The crisis 
however rebounded at the start of the Easter festivities in mid-February 1918. A 
new Custos, Father Diotallevi, arrived in Jerusalem “with clear instructions in 
hand concerning the cessation of the French protectorate”
12
. The impact, to the 
satisfaction of the Italians, was immediate. “After having resisted the presiding 
Custos for a month and having succeeded in maintaining traditions”, Picot 
reports to his Department, “I have just run up against the new Custos’ decision 
which nothing can budge. Since his arrival the honors are no longer rendered 
and because I cannot force observance of the customary ceremonial I had to 
sever relations with the Custody.”
13
 It was however the Vatican who 
temporarily saved the French protectorate. On March 18, Cardinal Gasparri 
instructed the Custody to render honors to the French representative until a 
peace treaty was signed.
14
 
The Vatican's abrupt about-face was doubtless motivated by pressure from 
the French Episcopate, in particular Cardinal Amette, the Archbishop of Paris, 
whom the French Government asked to step in. Further, there was a desire to 
pacify French Catholics who were known to be highly attached to the 
protectorate. However by making a concession on the calendar and not on 
principles, since the Secretary of State did not make any changes in fact - the 
Holy See appeared to be aligning itself with the British position, having grasped 
the fatal implications in the long run for the French protectorate. This in fact 
was not the case, because the Vatican feared an Anglo-Zionist rule over the 
Holy Places and called for an international regime whose establishment clearly 
required appeasing France. Italy in any case had to temporarily resign itself. On 
May 25, 1918, the Ambassador of Italy in Paris wrote to Stephen Pichon, the 
                                                                
11 Ibid., pp. 158-159. 
12 Ibid. 
13 MAE, PA Jean Goût, 9 from Picot to J. Goût, Jerusalem, February 20, 1918. 
14 Sergio I. Minerbi, L'Italie et la Palestine, op.cit., pp 161-162; MAE, PA Albert Defrance, 56, 
from the Lieutenant de Saint Quentin to A. Defrance, March 28, 1918. 
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French Foreign Minister that: “the Government of the King in no way wishes 
(...) to broach at this time the examination (of the issue of the protectorate) and 
reserves the right to do so with the most amicable frankness at the time peace is 
concluded.”
15
 
Meanwhile the protectorate was provisionally out of danger. But the French, 
highly aware of this precarious situation, took pains to assuage British 
susceptibilities by avoiding emphasis on liturgical honors. In October 1918, for 
example, during a service to celebrate the liberation of the Holy Places, the 
Custos decided in accordance with the representative of France that it is 
preferable “only to invite the various representatives to the singing of Te Deum 
which ends the ceremony, and when no special honors are rendered to the 
delegate of the France commissariat.” The reason, according to the former is 
that “it would have been difficult to have our allies recognize that during a 
service in the honor of the liberation of Palestine by the Allies the 
representative of France was given special treatment.”
16
 
The French were careful about outward manifestations of the protectorate 
and made enormous efforts to regain their position within the Custody by 
providing, despite the lack of funds, a special allocation to the Franciscan 
missions in the Holy Land and even planned to provide direct financial 
assistance to the Custody. Similarly Paris was pleased to see that a French 
custodial vicar was appointed and there was a broad attempt to increase the 
number of French Franciscans in Palestine. The return to French protection of 
the Belgian Benedictines of the Dormition Church who had left the German 
branch of the Order was welcomed with disproportional satisfaction
17
. 
Nevertheless the restored protectorate was not much more than a facade each 
time its exercise required recourse to public order, i.e. the English Military 
Administration. The latter took malicious delight in dodging its duty, which had 
the inevitable effect of reducing the trust Catholics place in the power of a 
Protector who was unable to solve their problems. The French representatives 
developed a response to this delaying tactic but it too had its limits. This 
involved promoting “direct arrangements” with the Communities who 
customarily had dealings with France and had little desire to get involved with 
the British, the Protestants, in their affairs. 
At the start of the Peace Conference, France had still not given up entirely 
on saving its protectorate even though in a private meeting in December 1918 in 
London with Lloyd George Clémenceau, the President of the French Conseil, 
                                                                
15 MAE, E. Levant, Palestine, 8, from Bonnin to S. Pichon, May 25, 1918; from C. Barrère at the 
Department, June 15, 1918. 
16 Ibid., from Durieux, representative of the French High Commissioner in Palestine to S. Pichon, 
Jerusalem October 14, 1918.  
17 Ibid., from Durieux to G. Picot March 22, 1919. The news was announced by the Press Office. 
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explicitly ceded Palestine “from the Dan to Beersheba” in exchange for Syria. 
Later the British Prime Minister would state that his French counterpart had 
given up the protectorate by so doing, an interpretation rejected by France. 
Although it did not learn of the meeting until several weeks later, and 
Clemenceau would renege on his statements in March 1919, the Quai d’Orsay 
was highly displeased and interpreted it as not necessarily including the 
protectorate. The Quai was apparently relying on the recent good graces of the 
Custody who as time honored tradition would have it, used France's good 
offices to transmit a report presenting the claims of the Latins against the 
Greeks to the Powers, and a list of the damage caused by the Turks to 
Franciscan establishments.
18
 Barrère, the ambassador in Rome had no illusions 
concerning the Vatican but believed it was possible to modify its stance by 
citing the resentment of French Catholics, Jewish-Protestant domination of 
Catholic interests in Palestine, or by hinting at the possibility of a 
reestablishment of diplomatic ties between Paris and the Holy See. 
The disillusions however were not long in coming. Durieux, the 
representative of the French High Commissioner in Jerusalem demonstrated 
that the report from the Custody transmitted by France was full of ambiguities. 
Above all, the Vatican hid its persistent ill will behind an England who was 
playing its cards on the table. One of Barrère’s assistants stated on March 31, 
1919, “what bothered the Vatican is that England let it be known that it had 
France's withdrawal on the subject in its pocket”. The diplomat, who at the time 
knew nothing of the conversation between Clemenceau and Lloyd George the 
previous December, outlined what remained the French position after 
permanently ceding Palestine. Even if the Holy Land becomes British – which 
is far from being a certainty – a distinction must be made between the 
“territorial question” and “the religious question.” Between London and Paris, 
Gasparri assumes an air of neutrality which bodes ill. He lets it be known that if 
the French and the English reach an agreement, – which he knows is 
impossible – it “would sanction anything we want (...) both as regards the Holy 
Places and as regards the protectorate over the religious Catholics of all 
nationalities in Palestine.” However the Custody clearly states to Picot that “all 
the outward manifestations stemming from the protectorate will cease ipso facto 
when the peace treaty is signed with Turkey.”
19
 
The busy Peace Conference schedule, as well as the behind the scenes 
                                                                
18 Ibid., from Picot to the Department, Cairo, November 23, 1918, January 22 ,1919, February 2, 
1919. From J. Goût to Picot, January 27, 1919; from “P” in the Department, to Picot, February 3, 
1919. 
19 Ibid., Transcription of a conversation between "M. Herzog" representative of Cardinal Amette 
and “C.-R.” (Charles-Roux) March 31, 1919. National Archives 16N 3202 D21, from G. Picot to 
the Department, Beirut, July 9, 1919 
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filibuster to block the Syrian-Palestinian negotiations, indeed delayed the 
signing of the treaty with Turkey which only began to be drawn up in late 1919. 
But in September, as soon as the English let the French take over militarily in 
Lebanon and Syria hence leaving the Emir Feisal to his fate, the process leading 
to the final settlement is on track. The French renounce their claims to Palestine 
– which had mainly become bargaining chips, in exchange for a Syria carved 
out mainly around Beirut and Damascus. The Quai d’Orsay had already 
developed a contingency plan for the religious side of the issue: the Holy 
Places, it argued “could be placed under flie authority of an international 
commission which would be comparable to the Danube international 
commission.” This commission could if necessary be presided over by a French 
delegate who would receive the title of the Governor of Jerusalem. Or better 
yet: its role would also be to extend its powers to Moslem holy sites.
20
 This is 
clearly the groundwork for a future plan for the international commission for 
the Holy Places. In the meantime, there was a flurry of episcopal activity in late 
1919 and early 1920. After Cardinal Bourne, who came to show that England 
also had Catholics, and Cardinal Giustini, the standard-bearer for Italy, it was 
Cardinal Dubois, the archbishop of Rouen’s turn to close the rounds with the 
pomp and circumstance still granted to the protectorate.
21
 Clearly however its 
days were numbered. Attempts made by Clémenceau on May 22 in Paris and 
then by Paul Cambon in February 1920 in London to put off the issue of the 
Holy Places had little effect. 
Although the future Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey was not yet ready in 
the Spring of 1920, the success of Mustapha Kemal in Anatolia and the French 
intent to remove Feisal from Syria forced the French and the English to finally 
come to grips with the long postponed issue of partition. The issue was settled 
at the San Remo Conference on April 24, 1920. Pushed by Charles-Roux, 
Alexandre Millerand, the new President of the French Conseil, decides to 
reiterate his request to Britain, the future mandatory power in Palestine, “not to 
touch the traditional existing rights” in other words the French protectorate. 
Lloyd George and Nitti, the Italian President, are firm in their resolve, which 
forces him to formally abandon the preservation of “special privileges” of 
France in Palestine. “There will no longer be any question of the protection of 
Catholics in the East by one country or another” summarized Nitti. (...) The 
religious communities can no longer claim that their rights are protected more 
                                                                
20 M.A.E., E. Levant, Palestine, 8, from the Office of political affairs to the Secretariat of the 
Peace Conference, April 6, 1919. This plan is presented in this document as the one outlined as of 
December 1917 by Picot and Sykes together. I have not found any direct record of these 
conversations. 
21 Sergio I. Minerbi, op.cit: on the mission of Cardinal Dubois, press releases and travel diary in 
M.A.E., PA Jean Goût, 8, PA Charles-Roux IX, PA R. Coulondre, 2. 
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by the representatives of one power than by the representatives of another and 
(...) there will no longer be any claims against clergy who do not wish to render 
'honors' to the country which demands them”
22
. Nevertheless, the Italian 
support has a price tag to which Lloyd George has no choice but to agree to; 
namely the formation of an International Commission on the Holy Places. 
Millerand may have seized the idea (which had already been advanced by 
French diplomacy) as a kind of life buoy since in addition he was granted his 
request to have the President of the Commission named by the Council of the 
League of Nations and not by the Mandate power. The French renunciation of 
the protectorate at San Remo was hence linked to other plans, as the British 
were soon to discover. 
 
The Finalization of the French Defeat (1920-1924) 
Over the next four years, France used the full bag of tricks and quibbles 
possible to preserve certain religious privileges in Palestine, either by saving 
some of the outward manifestations of the former protectorate or by obtaining a 
predominant role in the Commission on the Holy Places. This was a game it 
could not play without some kind of support from the Vatican which like the 
other Powers involved, sparked rivalries to achieve its own ends. 
For the English, as for the Italians, there was no doubt that the days of the 
protectorate are over. Herbert Samuel, the first British High Commissioner in 
Palestine, reminds Cardinal Gasparri: that “there is no French protectorate any 
more, (..) France gave it up in San Remo”
23
. This position was pointedly 
repeated by Lord Curzon in the Vatican on August 6, 1920, but challenged by 
the French, inspired in particular by their new Charge d'affaires in the Vatican, 
Doulcet. In December 1920 just before Christmas, the Quai sent the following 
argument to London. Presuming that the notes taken by the Italian secretary in 
San Remo, which are considered accurate in this affair, were indeed “true 
minutes, revised and signed by the parties involved,” Millerand only gave up 
French privileges in Palestine and not in the whole Middle East; and above all 
he only gave up the right to intervene and not the right to honors. Hence “if the 
representative of France can no longer demand honors he still has the right to 
accept them (...) nothing prevents the Holy See from ordering their preservation 
(...) nothing authorizes the British from breaking with tradition”. This 
preservation is legitimate and desirable. Legitimate since "the honors were not 
only as Lord Curzon claims, “the outcome and the symbol of the protectorate 
(...); they were first of all the memory of a past which no one can abolish.” 
                                                                
22 Ibid. and primarily MAE, E. Levant, Palestine, 8, copy of the “notes of the (Italian) secretary 
taken during the meeting on April 24, 1920 at 16:00 at the Villa Devachan”. 
23 M.A.E., E. Levant, Palestine, 8, from Doulcet to A. Millerand, n° 37, undated. 
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They were desirable since the British, a Protestant Power, cannot make a claim 
to it and “its High Commissioner in Palestine is a Jew and the Holy See never 
accepted under the former rule that honors were rendered to a non-Catholic 
representative of the protector power”
24
. 
In fact, in sanctuaries in Jerusalem and in Palestine in general, the honors 
were indeed maintained by the Custos and the Latin Patriarchate on instructions 
from the Holy See. This enabled Cardinal Gasparri to express his discontent to 
London as regards the “Judaization” of the Holy Land, the obstacles to 
pilgrimages and the coming of clergy other than British. “If the Capitulations 
would cease,” he stated to Herbert Samuel, “the Latins would no longer need a 
defender in the sense of a protector but (...) they could still need a defender in 
the sense of a lawyer”.  The Cardinal does not hide the fact that as regards 
future commission “it would not be very favorable to him and that he did not 
see very well how it would be organized. Nevertheless, there as well it would 
be normal and useful to have the services of a lawyer, an advisor”
25
. This did 
not stop him at the same time from warning France that temporary preservation 
of the status quo and consular honors would not affect the future. 
Thus, contrary to all expectations, France continued to receive the traditional 
honors during services that remained as poorly attended by representatives of 
other countries, and continued to intervene and act as an arbitrator. All this was 
to the great irritation of the Mandate Power, reined in because of the collapse of 
the treaty of Sèvres in August 1920, the time needed to ratify the mandates, and 
the formulation of a new treaty with the Turks (the Lausanne Treaty 1923). But 
when the French representative turns to the British to help solve a problem – the 
repair needed at the Star of Bethlehem in August 1920 or the incident at 
Gethsemane between Franciscans and Greek Orthodox in October –, the British 
Authorities no longer turned a deaf ear. Rather, they let it be known to the 
parties involved that they should address themselves directly to them. As a 
result, Doulcet notes, “our privilege disappears automatically because it existed 
only to the extent that is was efficient as a protector and that we were able to 
guarantee it during the time of the Turks”
26
. Similarly, trapped by its argument 
                                                                
24 M.A.E., E Levant, Palestine, 9, from Doulcet to G. Leygues, November 15, 1920; note. “The 
liturgical honors due to representatives of France in Palestine” December 14, 1920; message from 
the Department to several posts (including London), December 16, 1920. M.A.E., E Levant, 
Palestine, 27, from Poincaré to Lord Hardinge, British Ambassador to Paris, August 24, 1922 (no 
response received to this letter). The argument of no renunciation of the protectorate in the East 
except in Palestine appears to have been dropped quickly. 
25 M.A.E., E Levant, Palestine, 8, from Doulcet to Millerand, n° 37, op.cit; 9, from Doulcet to the 
Department, December 21 and 27, 1920. 
26 M.A.E., E Levant, Palestine, 8, from Doulcet to Millerand, June 22, 1920; E Levant, Palestine, 
9, from J. Rais French Consul in Jerusalem to Millerand, August 17, 1920; from Rais to the 
Department, October 3, 1920; from Rais to Briand, July 22, 1921, from Doulcet to G. Leygues, 
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concerning adherence to the status quo while waiting for the official restoration 
of peace and lacking Italian support, France must agree to withdraw the French 
detachment stationed in the Saint Sepulchre in February 1921
27
. 
The British are only able to extract themselves from this imbroglio after the 
signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in early 1924. Bombarded by “very 
trenchant” notes from the British, Cardinal Gasparri warns Paris on February 17 
“that the Holy See cannot disregard the complaints of the British Government 
and hence is obliged to order that the liturgical honors in Palestine cease to be 
rendered to the representatives of France”. Doulcet succeeds in obtaining a 
grace period claiming an ongoing “diplomatic conversation” with England. 
Enough time for Paris to elicit pressure from the French episcopate, this time in 
vain. On March 18, 1924, Mgr. Ceretti, the nonce, notifies the Quai of the 
irrevocable end of liturgical honors “except in buildings which are French 
property; in the others these honors will not be rendered to anyone”
28
. Little 
consolation for France who, to avoid humiliation for the coming Easter 
celebrations, recalls its Consul under sudden pretext and then, after verification 
of the application of the measure, chooses to desert the ceremonies at the Saint 
Sepulchre and retreat to the unchanged festivities in the French edifices.
29
 
Another option for France after April 1920 to preserve bits and pieces of its 
former protectorate was to obtain a special position on the International 
Commission on the Holy Places. The idea of an international and interfaith 
body was formalized in Article 95 of the Treaty of Sevres, and taken up again 
in article 14 of the Palestinian Mandate ratified in July of 1922. France agreed 
to this provided it would obtain the presidency of the commission. The Vatican 
judged it to be “highly insufficient as regards guarantees to Catholics” and 
wanted to obtain “a statute which would exclude Jews” on the commission. But 
here again Italy, France and the Vatican were unable to form an allied front. 
The Italians naturally refused to accept the French conditions. The Vatican 
opted for a Belgian president. France was unable to adopt the criticisms of the 
Holy See having prepared the texts for Mandates A with the British and because 
it had repeatedly committed itself to supporting the British Government
30
. In 
fact highly complex negotiations concerning the formation and the role of this 
                                                                                                                                                             
October 19, 1920. 
27 The Italians who like the French had obtained permission to send a symbolic detachment for 
the conquest of Palestine also stood guard at the Saint Sepulchre. On this affair: M.A.E., E 
Levant, Palestine, 9. 
28 M.A.E., E Levant, Palestine, 27, from Doulcet to Poincaré, February 17, 1924 and April 9, 
1924; notes on the visit of the nonce to M. de Peretti (by Louis Canet), March 18, 1924. 
29 Ibid., from Poincaré to several posts (including Jerusalem), March 24, 1924; from Rais to the 
Department March 26, 1924; from Ballereau, the acting consul of the Jerusalem Consulate, April 
18 and 21, 1922. 
30 M.A.E., PA A. Millerand, 66, handwritten letter from J. Goût to Millerand, May 26, 1922. 
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commission were partly responsible for the delay in which the League of 
Nations ratified the mandates. 
It is understandable that these squabbles were a hindrance to the Zionists 
who were involved in addition in difficult border negotiations with France. It 
was apparently with the intention of clearing the way for ratification that the 
Zionists intervened for the first time in this domain in February 1922. Sokolov 
then expressed to Millerand his “desire (...) to see France occupy an essential 
place in the Holy Places.” Senator Anatole de Monzie, a supporter of the 
Zionist cause and tempted by the Presidency of the international commission 
himself, agreed to communicate the “friendly dispositions” of the Zionists to 
higher authorities in Paris where no stone is left unturned
31
. On the eve of an 
unsure ratification, the Zionists renew their offers of service. 
They however carry no weight in London in this matter. The British 
Government continues to “be totally opposed to the formation of a permanent 
Commission of a political nature whose members would be appointed by others 
than itself. The only gesture they make is in a new version of article 14 for a 
'temporary commission of legal experts' with a rotating presidency
32
. This 
obviously is not to the liking of either France or the Vatican. Even in early July 
the opposition of the Holy See and the support of the Spanish, whose turn it is 
to preside the Council of the League of Nations, encourage French resistance. 
This was prompted by the advice of Father Dhorme, the prior of the 
Dominicans in Jerusalem and Louis Canet, the advisor of the Quai for religious 
affairs. Despite last minute hesitations, France however decides because of its 
Syrian policy to ratify the mandates, thus renouncing its prime form of pressure 
in the issue of the commission. Even though the discussions last a few months 
longer, the affair was destined to fail. Britain was thus witness to a failure 
which gave it great satisfaction, and never in fact created the Commission on 
Holy Places, preferring to take over the role which France had held for so many 
years. 
Thus after six embattled years, the French defeat was complete. The clearly 
disproportional investment of French diplomacy in the defense of the 
protectorate, an outdated form of influence, is hence highly comparable to the 
irrational attitude of the Italians as S.I. Minerbi shows in his analysis. The 
French diplomats, like the Italians, were unable to rise above beliefs and 
antiquated conduct and devise a new and more reality-based strategy of 
influence. 
With doubtful value as to rival national interests, the struggle was for many 
                                                                
31 M.A.E., E Levant, Sionisme, 16, from A de Monzie to Poincaré, February 8, 1922; “note on 
Zionism”, February 17, 1922; M.A.E., E Levant, Palestine, 9, from Poincaré to Monzie, March 9, 
1922. 
32 M.A.E. PA A. Millerand, 66, from J. Goût to Millerand, June 26, 1922. 
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years an obstacle to religious peace in the Holy Land. By taking over the 
religious protectorate, Britain deliberately chose not to apply an international 
decision, by a kind of “right of occupation”. This was clearly a pernicious 
example. The Mandatory and Protector Power was soon required to cope with 
disturbances affecting not only the Christian Holy Places but also and above all 
the Jewish and Moslem sanctuaries. This led to an increasingly inextricable 
situation. Nevertheless the Catholic Powers also bear heavy responsibility in 
this state of affairs. Unable to quell the rivalries of the past, they contributed to 
the failure of the first of many forms of internationalization of the Holy Land 
envisaged to this day. 
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